Sue the Ba… rrister: 2005 by Bladon, Geoffrey
SUE THE BA .. .  RRISTER: 2005
G.L. Bladon*
In order to find a lawyer negligent in the conduct of litigation, the conduct com­
plained of must be egregious and not just an error in judgment. The standard of 
care must be judged in relation to the state of knowledge that existed at the time 
of the alleged negligent act and not with the benefit of hindsight.2
Introduction
The modem exposition of barristers’ negligence was set out by Krever, J. in Demarco
v. Ungaro:3
It has not now, and should not be, public policy in Ontario to confer exclusively 
on lawyers engaged in Court work an immunity possessed by no other profes­
sional person.... In the light of recent developments in the law of professional 
negligence and the rising incidents of “malpractice” actions against physicians 
(and especially surgeons who may be thought to be to physicians what barristers 
are to solicitors), I do not believe that enlightened, non-legally trained members 
of the community would agree with me if I were to hold that the public interest 
requires litigation lawyers to be immune from actions for negligence.... Indeed,
I find it difficult to believe that a decision made by a lawyer in the conduct of a 
case will be held to be negligence as opposed to a mere error of judgement. But
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Prof. John McEvoy for his extensive review of an 
earlier draft of this paper and the many helpful suggestions which resulted.
1 A British barrister’s immunity from civil suit was justified on policy grounds in Rondell v. Worsley, 
[1967] 3 All ER 993 (HL), recently reversed in Hall v. Simonds (2000), HLJ No. 43, but not without 
caution. A barrister has never been immune from suit in Canada because of the joint profession of bar­
rister and solicitor: Leslie v. Ball (1863), 22 UCQB 512; Wade v. Ball (1870), 20 UCCP 302.
2 GF v. Reardon, [2004] OJ No. 434 (Ont. SCJ) per Jarvis J. [“Folland (Jarvis J.)”]. This definition of 
the standard of care owed by a lawyer conducting litigation enjoys wide support. See Bertucci v. 
Marchioni (2001), OJ No. 2198 (SCJ); Bhagat v. Raby (Trustee of): [2000] OJ No. 1126 (SCJ) - both 
of which were relied upon by Jarvis J. See as well Campion and Dimmer, Professional Liability In 
Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 1994 at p. 7-41 and the authorities in footnotes 264 and 265, looseleaf revi­
sion, 2003.
3 (1979) 21 OR (2d) 673 at 693.
there may be cases in which the error is so egregious that a Court will conclude
that it is negligence.
The issue of the quality of care expected of a lawyer conducting a trial on behalf of 
a client was canvassed recently by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Folland et al v. 
Reardon:4 The plaintiff, Folland, was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 
five years imprisonment. After serving three years, Folland was released on bail 
pending his appeal which turned on the admission of fresh evidence. The appeal suc­
ceeded, the conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.5 When the Crown 
elected not to retry him, Folland sued his lawyer alleging negligence, breach of con­
tract and breach of fiduciary duty in the defence of the sexual assault charge.
The attack on the lawyer, Reardon, focussed on three issues: (i) his failure to 
obtain DNA testing of a third party who admitted committing the assault; (ii) his 
cross-examination of the complainant and (iii) his examination-in-chief of the 
accused.6 Reardon succeeded on a summary judgment motion before Jarvis J. to have 
the action struck out. The Ontario Court of Appeal, however, permitted the action to 
proceed to trial. In its decision, the Court withdrew from the generally accepted 
“egregious” standard for barristers’ liability and applied the standard of ordinary neg­
ligence.
The Criminal Case7
The victim, Folland and another male (Harris) were painting the victim’s apartment 
on 22 November 1993 and drinking beer. In the early evening they purchased a 
“mickey” of vodka and, at the same time, the accused stole a 40-ounce bottle of 
vodka from the liquor store. They returned to the apartment and continued painting 
and drinking. At about 1:00 am on 23 November 1993, the victim removed her glass­
es and went to bed wearing a T-shirt, bra and pink underwear. Sometime later she 
awoke to find a man having sexual intercourse with her whom she identified as 
Folland. The police were called. Harris told them that he had raped the victim. 
Nonetheless, the police charged Folland based on the victim’s identification.8 The
4 2005 Can LII 1403 (Ont. C. A.), [“Folland (Doherty J.A.)”]. The decision also reviewed the ‘but for’ 
test for causation and the merits of a ‘lost chance’ claim.
5 R v. Folland (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 290 (CA) [“Folland (Rosenberg J.A.)”]
6 Folland (Doherty J.A.), at para. 23.
7 An extensive review of the facts is found in the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal on the appeal 
in the criminal case, Folland (Rosenberg J.A.) at p. 293.
8 There was other evidence implicating the accused at the trial: for example, (a) the victim testified she 
overheard the accused say to Harris: “I don’t know why you’re fucking lying for me, you don’t have 
to lie, I did it, I had a good time, I think I’ll do it again.” (b) At the police station three hours later and 
while still intoxicated, the accused/plaintiff was asked if he knew why he had been arrested; he replied 
“I’m a rapist”.
victim was examined at the hospital. No evidence of ejaculation was found in her 
vagina. The police did find a pair of men’s underwear in the victim’s bed which she 
said had not been there in the morning preceding the assault. At the trial, the DNA 
evidence established that Folland was not the source of the semen stain on the male 
underwear.
On the appeal the accused sought to admit fresh DNA evidence which matched 
the semen on the underwear to Harris. The Crown opposed the application arguing a 
lack of due diligence by the defence. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and 
ordered a new trial; the Court did not acquit because the evidence was not conclusive 
in light of the prior intimate relationship between the victim and Harris.
The Civil Action
On receipt of the statement of claim in the malpractice action, the lawyer brought a 
motion for summary judgment arguing, inter alia,9 that there was no genuine issue 
for trial. In response, Folland filed an affidavit by Alan Gold, described by Doherty 
J.A. as “a well known and respected specialist in criminal litigation.”10 In that affi­
davit, Mr. Gold “opined” that the ‘prime deficiency’ in the criminal defence lawyer’s 
conduct was “his failure to secure DNA testing of Mr. Harris prior to the trial to show 
that Mr. Harris was the source of the unknown semen on the [male] underwear found 
in the complainant’s bed”.11 Furthermore Mr. Gold said that the lawyer’s conduct fell 
below the standard required of a competent counsel when “he tested the com­
plainant’s eye sight during cross-examination at the trial despite the fact that she 
demonstrated that her vision was more than adequate under the same line of ques­
tioning at the preliminary inquiry”.12 Finally, there was the issue of the theft of the 
40-ounce bottle of vodka and how this fact might affect the accused’s credibility 
before the jury. Gold considered that Reardon failed to meet the requisite standard of 
care because the examination in chief created an impeachment opportunity in cross- 
examination by the Crown which was seized upon by the trial judge when instruct­
ing the jury on the issue of credibility.
The judge on the summary judgment motion held that while the lawyer’s rep­
resentation may not have been perfect, there was “no evidence of egregious errors by 
him”.13 On that basis, and on the alternative failure of the plaintiff to establish cau­
9 In addition, the action was challenged as an abuse of process, res judicata and issue estoppel.
10 Folland (Doherty J.A.), at para. 23.
h Ibid.
12 Ibid., at para. 24.
13 Folland (Jarvis, J.), at para. 26.
sation, the action was dismissed as there were no genuine issues for trial. Folland 
appealed to the Court of Appeal. Doherty J.A., for a unanimous court found that the 
motion judge “applied the wrong standard of care”;14 the reference by the motion 
judge “to ‘egregious errors’ and ‘the clearest of cases’ tells me that he erroneously 
demanded something more than a departure from the standard of a reasonably com­
petent lawyer defending a criminal case.”15
In reaching his conclusion Doherty J.A. considers the jurisprudence applying 
the ‘egregious’ test and finds the failure to hold courtroom lawyers to the common 
reasonableness standard marks them as different from other professionals. Noting the 
different standard of care expected of a solicitor (the reasonableness standard) from 
that applicable to a barrister (the egregious standard), which “would be difficult to 
make in some situations,”16 Doherty J.A. concludes:17
I see no justification for departing from the reasonableness standard. The stan­
dard has proven to be sufficiently flexible and fact-sensitive to be effectively 
applied to a myriad of situations in which allegations of negligence arise out of 
the delicate exercise of judgment by professionals. Without diminishing the dif­
ficulty o f many judgments that counsel must make in the course of litigation, the 
judgment calls made by lawyers are no more difficult than those made by other 
professionals. The decisions of other professionals are routinely subjected to a 
reasonableness standard in negligence lawsuits. I see no reason why lawyers 
should not be subjected to the same standard: Major v. Buchann (1975), 9 OR 
(2d) 491 at 510 (HC).
Analysis
With respect, there may be very good reason for treating courtroom lawyers differ­
ently than other professionals such as doctors, engineers and accountants. In relation 
to those professionals, there is (at least to some extent) a generally accepted objec­
tive science underlying their field of endeavour. No seasoned courtroom lawyer 
would suggest for a moment that there are commonly accepted methods of conduct­
ing a trial. Much depends upon the particular lawyer’s appreciation of the particular
14 Folland (Doherty J.A.), at para. 46.
15 Ibid., at para. 45.
16 Ibid., at para. 42.
17 Ibid., at para. 41.
18 The many textbooks on Advocacy support this view:
(1) “All lawyers understand that there is no “right way” to try a case.” Modern Trial Advocacy, Steven 
Lubet, Canadian Edition, Sheila Block and Cynthia Tape, Editors, (NITA, 1995) page xxvii;
circumstances at play - facts, opposing counsel, witness, judge, jury - at the particu­
lar time and place. Indeed, it is fair to say that no two experienced lawyers would run 
a trial - from the development of the theory of the case to examining and cross-exam­
ining of witnesses - in the same way.18
While it may be said that the acquisition of fundamental trial skills and, to 
some extent the preparation for trial, reflects a certain methodology, the minute to 
minute conduct of the trial itself means many spur-of-the-moment decisions which 
depend upon a multitude of factors at that precise instant in time. The jurisprudence 
prior to the recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Folland, and even in 
that decision itself, acknowledges the hurley-burley of the courtroom. It is common
(2) [...Advocacy] requires histrionic gifts, that it gains by a sense of music and by the dramatic sense, 
and that it requires as much of the art of a dialectician as a man can achieve, and as much of the art of 
the rhetorician as he can keep under control. It undoubtedly requires the logical faculty and a sense of 
design. It calls for control of temper and emotion. It is then in truth an art.” . . . .
But he is an actor who creates the part he plays. He must select the words that make his lines. He must 
be the thought they express and the arrangement of the argument they convey. He must be ready in a 
moment to alter, to cut and to recreate, to suit the sudden and unforeseeable events of the day’s hear­
ing, and these changes of front he must make without their being apparent to anyone. Duty and Art In 
Advocacy, Sir Malcolm Hilbery, Stevens and Sons, London, 1951, pages 25 and 27.
(4) “Advocacy as an Art
Advocacy is not a science, like law, but an art, and therefore, to a great extent, it is a highly individual 
attainment. Like every other art - and like knowledge of law, for that matter - it cannot be developed 
with some initial aptitude, and it cannot be mastered without practical experience of handling cases. On 
the other hand, again like every other art, it does not depend on aptitude and experience alone, but it 
has its rules of technique. These rules of technique can be explained and learnt. They are like the prin­
ciple of perspective and the use of colours in painting, or scales and arpeggios in music, or the making 
of incisions and the insertion of stitches in surgery.
The difference between the science of law and the art of advocacy can be simply stated. So far as law 
is concerned, once its principles are known and understood, there is an end to the matter. To know the 
technique of advocacy, however, it is only the starting point: it has to be handled and used in varied cir­
cumstances, arid according to one’s own individual style. The Technique o f Advocacy, The John H. 
Munkman, Stevens and Sons Limited, London: 1951, page 4.
(5) “It requires the greatest ingenuity; a habit of logical thought; clearness of perception in general; infi­
nite patience and self control; power to read men’s minds intuitively, to judge their characters by their 
faces, to appreciate their motives; ability to act with force and precision; a masterful knowledge of the 
subject matter itself; an extreme caution; and, above all, the instinct to discover the weak point in the 
witness under examination. One has to deal with prodigious variety of witnesses testifying under an 
infinite number of differing circumstances. It involves all shades and complexions of human morals, 
human passions, and human intelligence. It is a mental dual between counsel and witness. The Art o f  
Cross-Examination, Francis L. Wellman, McMillan Publishing Company, Collier Books Edition, 1936, 
page 28.
(6) “The definitive book about trial work hasn’t been written yet - and in that observation I include this 
book. Neither is it probable that the locus classicus about the art of trial ever will or can be written 
because the proper way to try every case (or even any case) has not yet been established. That is at least 
partly because there is no universal case. The facts change from trial to trial and so do the witness,
ground that lawyers are not held to a standard of perfection, their decisions at the trial 
should not be viewed with the benefit of hindsight, and errors of judgment cannot be 
characterized as negligence.19 It was, under the former jurisprudence, only when the 
error was “egregious” (i.e. remarkable, extraordinary, flagrant) that the lawyer was 
liable in negligence; a standard which in practice proved relatively easy to apply.
After Folland the question becomes more ephemeral: does an error of judg­
ment reflect a decision not expected of a “reasonably competence defence coun­
sel”?20 Of course, the “egregious” standard can be incorporated into the notion of 
reasonableness. To make this very point, Doherty J.A. referred to Blackburn v. 
Lampkin21 and quoted from Farcas v. Rashwan22 where Boyko J. said:
To succeed at trial, the respondents would have to demonstrate that the conduct 
of Farcas in representing Rashwan at her trial on assault charges fell below the 
conduct expected of a reasonably competent lawyer. The case law indicates that 
an error in judgment does not constitute negligence. A lawyer’s error must be 
egregious to rise to the level o f negligence.23
It is the final sentence in this extract that Doherty J.A. found to be the real problem. 
It suggests that the barrister’s professional responsibility is less than that expected of 
other professionals. When we judge ourselves we are not as vigorous, or the law is 
not as rigorous; i.e. trial counsel are held to a more forgiving standard,24 when com­
pared to the standard applied to other professionals, including solicitors.25 As
counsel and tribunal. In rare instances when an appeal court orders a retrial, it is not uncommon for 
there to be variations even from trial to trial of the same case. There are practically limitless combina­
tions of judge, counsel and cause, and the introduction of juries raises the level of complexity that 
would make even an astronomer envious. Further, the law does not hold still and people have good 
days and bad days, brilliant days and days when they should not go to court or anywhere else.” The Art 
o f Trial, Robert B. White, Q.C., Canada Law Book Inc. Aurora, Ont., 1993, page vii.
(7) “Finally, great advocates must be possessed of personal qualities that give them the fortitude to pro­
ceed as they deem best upon their judgment alone, and not to waver in the face of what may appear to 
be initial ridicule and rebuke from bench or bar.” On Trial, advocacy skills law and practice  Geoffrey 
D. E. Adair (2nd ed.) LexisNexis Canada Inc., Markham, Ont., 2004, page 1.
19 Blackburn v. Lapkin (1996), 28 OR (3d) 292 at 309: Folland (Doherty J.A.) at para. 44.
20 Folland (Doherty J.A.), at para. 43.
21 (1996), 28 OR (3d) 292 at 309.
22 (July 26, 2001) 99/CU/175869 (Ont SCJ), aff’d [2002] OJ No. 42 (CA).
23 Folland (Doherty J.A.), at para. 6.
24 Folland (Doherty J.A.), at para. 35.
25 See the reference to Hagblom v. Henderson (2003), 232 Sask. R. 81 at para. 52-72 and Folland 
(Doherty J.A.) at para. 40.
26 Folland (Doherty J.A.), at para. 43.
Doherty J.A. says:26
Courts should avoid using phrases like ‘egregious error’ and ‘clearest of cases’ 
when describing the circumstances in which negligence actions will succeed 
against lawyers. These phrases invite the application of an inappropriately low 
standard of care to the conduct o f lawyers. At the very best, these phrases create 
the appearance that when an allegation of negligence is made against a lawyer, 
judges (former lawyers) will subject those claims to less vigorous scrutiny than 
claims made against others: see Kitchen v. Royal Air Forces Association et al.,
[1958] 2 All ER 241 at 245 (CA).
He then rejects the “egregious” standard expressly: “Plaintiffs who sue their lawyers 
should not be required to show their claims of negligence are any stronger than any 
other claims of negligence before they are allowed to proceed to trial”.27 Hence the 
“new” and “higher” standard of reasonableness required of a lawyer in the conduct 
of a trial.
How then is this new standard to be applied? Despite the fact that the Court of 
Appeal in the criminal case admitted the fresh DNA evidence over the Crown’s due 
diligence argument, Doherty J.A. held that the failure to obtain Harris’ DNA before 
the trial constituted, in the context of the summary judgment motion, a genuine issue 
for trial given the expert affidavit evidence. The other allegations of negligence relat­
ing to the cross-examination of the victim and the examination-in-chief of the 
accused were summarily addressed and again sustained as issues for trial:
Mr. Gold’s report constituted some evidence that Reardon did not meet the 
appropriate standard in these two respects. It was not for the motion judge to 
decide the ultimate question of whether Reardon did or did not meet this stan­
dard, even if the two errors identified by Mr. Gold were established. The motion 
judge’s implied qualitative analysis o f these alleged shortcomings, while consis­
tent with the trial judge’s role, is inconsistent with the limited function assigned 
to him on a motion for summary judgment. The motion judge was wrong in 
holding there was no triable issue as to whether Reardon was negligent.28
A more detailed examination is warranted. Firstly, the responsibility of the motion 
judge on a summary judgment application is to take a “hard look” at the evidence to 
determine if there is a genuine issue for trial.29 Notwithstanding a dispute on facts or
27 Ibid., at para. 45.
28 Ibid., at para. 56.
29 Irving Ungerman Ltd. v. Gallanis (1991), 4 OR (3d) 545 at 555 51; Rozin v. Ilitchev (2003), 66 OR 
(3d) 410 (CA).
a question of credibility, a defendant will succeed on a summary judgment motion in 
striking the plaintiff’s claim if, assuming the resolution of those issues in favour of 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s case still fails to establish genuine issues to be tried. 
Indeed, this was the argument made on behalf of the lawyer before the motion judge 
and accepted by him, i.e. “none of the alleged deficiencies... rose to the level of neg­
ligence.”30 It is precisely this kind of analysis that is required of the motion judge on 
a summary judgment application.31
Bearing in mind the admonition against the use of hindsight and the fact that 
lawyers are not to be held to a standard of perfection, did the allegations of miscon­
duct against Reardon amount to negligence?
1. DNA Evidence
Was the lawyer at fault for failing to obtain Harris’ DNA in advance of the trial in 
order that it might be tested against the semen stained underwear found in the vic­
tim’s bed following the assault? Harris had admitted committing the assault to the 
police on the night of the offence and he had confessed to his friends and relatives of 
the accused; the lawyer “repeatedly pressed crown counsel, in writing, to have the 
police conduct a fuller investigation of Harris’ role in the affair and suggested to 
Crown counsel that he should call Harris as a witness at the trial so the full story 
could be told before the jury”.32 Further the lawyer reasonably expected, leading up 
to the trial, that Harris would admit to having had intercourse with the victim on the 
night of the assault.33 Attempts to subpoena Harris for the trial were unsuccessful. At 
that point it was apparent that he was no longer cooperative with the defence and 
might deny the assault if he testified. As noted on the appeal, this would necessitate 
having Harris declared adverse or hostile and confronting him with his apparent 
inconsistent statements.34 Finally, it should be remembered that Harris and the vic­
tim had been intimate previously and thus this DNA evidence would not be determi­
native. These facts alone would defeat any suggestion that the lawyer was negligent, 
on any standard, in failing to obtain Harris’ DNA. But, in addition, the judge on the 
summary judgment motion had before him - as a fact - the finding of Rosenberg J.A. 
on the fresh evidence application in the Court of Appeal. In that context, the issue is 
whether trial counsel had exercised due diligence. The Crown raised this argument.
30 Folland (Doherty J.A.), at paras. 3-4.
31 Pizza Pizza Limited v. Gillispie (1990), 75 OR (2d) 225 (Gen. Div.).
32 Folland (Rosenberg J.A.), at pp. 300- 301.
33 Ibid., at p. 300.
34 Folland (Jarvis J), at para. 9.
The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence of Harris’ DNA and stated:
The failure to take extraordinary measures to try to obtain bodily substances 
from Harris was not unreasonable.35
It is difficult to imagine a more explicit statement on the issue of the defence lawyer’s 
alleged lack of due care. In the civil appeal, however, Doherty J.A. was not con­
vinced.36 He concluded that the reasoning of Rosenberg J.A. in the criminal appeal 
established (i) that it was reasonable for the lawyer to have relied on Harris’ cooper­
ation prior to the trial stage; (ii) that the Crown’s lack of cooperation with the defence 
to pursue Harris’ DNA precluded it from arguing a lack of due diligence and (iii) 
even assuming a lack of due diligence, the failure would not foreclose the admission 
of DNA evidence on the appeal. As a result, Doherty J.A. concluded:
None of these observations are relevant to Folland’s allegation that Reardon was 
negligent in not taking steps to obtain the DNA evidence prior to proceeding to 
trial. In my view, nothing in the comments o f Rosenberg J.A. should be taken as 
negating or diminishing the opinion advanced by Mr. Gold.37
It is clear from a reading of the decision in the criminal appeal that the conduct of the 
lawyer was scrutinized under the light of due diligence and the lawyer was not found 
wanting. With respect, for Doherty J.A. and a differently constituted panel of the 
Court of Appeal, to suggest on the civil appeal that the criminal appeal context is dis­
tinguishable and that the remarks made in that decision on the propriety of the 
lawyer’s conduct are not relevant reminds one of that high authority Humpty 
Dumpty: “When I use a word, it means just what I chose it to mean, neither more, 
nor less.”38 At the very least, it is a distinction without a difference.
2. Cross-Examination of the Complainant
Before going to bed, the victim removed her glasses. Following the assault she said 
“that she told the man to get out of her room. As the man exited, she could see him 
because of the light coming into her darkened room through the open door. The com­
plainant identified Folland as her assailant.”39 Her eyesight was the significant com-
35 Folland (Rosenberg J.A.), at p. 301.
36 Folland (Doherty J.A.), at para. 52.
37 Ibid., at para. 53.
38 L. Carroll, Alice in Wonderland (Through the Looking-Glass) (Harpers & Brothers: New York and 
London, 1902.) at 117 and see Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L.), per Lord Atkin 
at 245.
39 Ibid., at para. 12.
ly, not. At the annual Sopinka Trial Moot and the regional competitions leading up to 
it, the same case is tried at least 20 times by law students, carefully advised, across 
the country. The experience indicates that at the regional level and at the national 
competition in Ottawa, no two trials are ever conducted the same way and it is impos­
sible to say that any one of these presentations failed to meet the standard of a rea­
sonably competent counsel. This, of course, illustrates -  as Jarvis J. recognized46 -  
“the different styles of advocacy and strategic decisions of trial counsel”.
However the standard of care is articulated, differences in advocacy must be 
accommodated. It is not a question of holding the barrister to a lower standard, rather 
the examination of his or her conduct of the trial must reflect a very real appreciation 
of the disparate nature of the task performed. Perhaps a sound beginning is found in 
the words of Borins J. (as he then was) in Blackburn:47
The authorities support the conclusion that the standard of care required of a 
lawyer is not one of perfection. An error of judgment alone does not constitute 
negligence. A lawyer who acts in good faith, and in an honest belief that his or 
her advice in the conduct of a client’s litigation are well founded, and in the best 
interest of the client, is not answerable for an error.
The difficulty lies in the next step. Perfection is not expected and errors of judgment 
are tolerated, but the issue is: when does the error in judgment amount to negligence? 
When is it unreasonable? Or, more particularly and clearly, when it is outside the 
wide parameters of acceptable performance of a barrister? When it is remarkable? 
extraordinary? Flagrant? ... In a word reflecting a genuine understanding of the con­
text, egregiousl
46 Folland (Jarvis J.), at para. 35.
47 Supra note 19, at p. 309.
